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litigation. Perhaps one can look to Gideon v. Wainwright, supra,
Douglas v. California,supra, and Griffin v. Illinois, supra, as guidelines to what the answers to these questions may be. From these
cases it is seen that the Court is in favor of construing the Contitution so as to extend its protection to the indigent and to prevent
discrimination against him.
John I. Rogers, II

Creditors' Rights-Tort Liability for Fraudulent Conveyance
At the time P's judgment against D was entered by a New York
court, D owned real estate in Puerto Rico. D, the judgment debtor,
transferred this property to a third party. P claimed that D conveyed this property for the purpose of hindering and defrauding P in
the collection of his judgment. P brought this action for the damages
which resulted from D's alleged fraudulent transfer. D moved to
dismiss P's action on the ground that P had no lien on the property
transferred. Held, order denying the motion to dismiss affirmed.
At common law whenever one improperly interfered with the execution of a judgment he was liable for any damages he caused to
the judgment creditor. James v. Powell, 266 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1966).
Courts generally agree that a general creditor, without a lien,
cannot maintain an action for damages. This principle is based
upon the legal right of one to use, enjoy or dispose of his property
without restriction until some other person obtains an interest in
the property which the law will protect. The law determines the
time and manner in which the property of a debtor ceases to
be subject to his disposition and becomes subject to the interest of
his creditor. Adler -v.Fenton, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 407 (1860). The
dissent in the principal case stated that a general creditor or a
judgment creditor without a lien on specific property has no cause
of action against his debtor. This statement, in so far as it relates
to general creditors, is supported by numerous cases.
In Brunvold v. Victor Johnson & Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 75, 138
P.2d 32 (1943), the court stated that it was settled law that no
tort liability exists against those participating in a fraudulent
transfer, at least where the creditor at the time of the transfer has
not reduced his claim to judgment and holds no lien upon the
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property conveyed. A general creditor was not permitted damages
when the debtor corporation disposed of all its assets while misrepresenting to the plaintiff that it was solvent and would pay its
debts. The court relied upon the fact that the plaintiff had not sued
out a writ of attachment and had no present intention of seizing
the property or of securing a lien. Graham v. Peale, 173 Fed. 9
(1st Cir. 1909). The dissent in the principal case relied in part
on Adler v. Fenton, supra, which held that a general creditor cannot bring an action on the case against his debtor or against
those combining and colluding with him to dispose of his property,
even though the disposition was to hinder, delay and defraud
creditors. The Adler case was to the effect that until a lien was
acquired, the creditor has no action for damages. It should be
noted that in the Adler case the plaintiff did not allege fraud, as
did P in the principal case.
While the dissent's statement in the principal case that a general
creditor cannot maintain an action for damages for fradulent conveyances may be supported by cases, few courts would deny a
judgment creditor a cause of action. In Quinby v. Strauss, 90 N.Y.
664 (1882), a judgment creditor brought an action against the
debtor and his attorney for a fraudulent conspiracy to keep the
debtor's personal property out of the reach of his creditors by the
execution of chattel mortgages to secure fictitious debts under which
the property was sold. On appeal the court affirmed a charge to
the jury that if the defendants were found guilty, the plaintiff was
entitled to a verdict for the amount of the judgment and an amount
for trouble and inconvenience. In the principal case the court
said the measure of damages is the loss or expense caused by the
interference.
A significant case arising out of an action for fraudulent conspiracy to interfere with the collection of a judgment is Findlay v.
McAllister, 113 U.S. 104 (1884). In that case the plaintiff had a
judgment against a county for the payment of certain bonds and
coupons which he held. The county court levied a special tax to
pay these claims. Some residents of the county, the defendants,
tried to prevent the county officials from collecting this tax. By
a writ of mandamus the county officials were ordered to collect
the tax. The Court stated, "The right of a judgment creditor to
proceed by action against those who rescue the person of his
debtor . . . or interfere with the goods of his debtor so as to
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prevent a levy or sale by the sheriff to satisfy his judgment, is well
recognized at common law." Findlay v. McAllister, supra, at 111.
In Yates v. Joyce, 11 Johns. Cas. 136 (N.Y. 1814), where certain
property of the debtor was disposed of to deprive a judgment
creditor of satisfaction the court said,
It is the pride of the common law that whenever it recognizes or creates a private right, it gives a remedy for the
willful violation of it. It is a sound principle that where the
fraudulent misconduct of a party occasion injury to the private
rights of another, he shall be responsible in damages for the
same.
In Mott v. Danforth, 6 Watts 304 (Pa. 1837), the debtor sold
his assets eight days before the due date on a promissory note to a
buyer who knew of the debts. The court said the fact that the
debt was not payable at the time of the alleged fraud was not a
valid objection. The court stated the plaintiffs claim was for the
injury suffered by the conveying of the property which might have
been available for the satisfaction of his debts by legal proceeding.
The court observed that the plaintiffs recovery could be defeated
by acts committed just before the creditor was about to proceed
to recover as well as by acts committed afterward.
In Lineker v. Dillon, 275 Fed. 460 (N.D. Cal. 1921), the court
noted that while an ordinary judgment at law for damages casting
no lien on the property of the judgment debtor presents no legal
obstacle to the alienation of the property of the debtor, the disposition, in order to protect the debtor, must be for a legitimate purpose,
for a valuable consideration and not for the fraudulent purpose
of evading the judgment. And if the disposition is for the purpose
of defeating the rights of the judgment creditor and is knowingly
participated in by others, the conspiring parties will be liable
to the creditor for damages caused him by their interference. By
dicta the court in Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593
(Id Cir. 1955), said that it was no longer necessary for the complaining creditor to have a lien.
In West Virginia every transfer of real and personal property
with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors is void unless
the purchaser pays valuable consideration without notice of the
fraudulent intent. W. VA. CoDE. ch. 40, art. 1, § 1 (Michie 1961).
It should be noted that while this statute permits the fraudulent
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transfer to be set aside, it does not provide for damages against
those who participate in the fraudulent conspiracy which is the
issue in the principal case. By statute, W. VA. CoDE ch. 38, art. 3, §
6 (Michie 1961), it is provided that every judgment for money
rendered in West Virginia shall be a lien on all the real estate
of or to which the defendant in the judgment is or becomes
possessed or entitled, at or after the date of the judgment, and the
lien shall continue so long as the judgment remains valid and enforceable. However, this lien is not effective against a bona fide
purchaser until it is docketed in the county where the real estate
is located. W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 3, § 7 (Michie 1961).
These statutes create a lien only where the property is located
within the state. If the real estate conveyed is located outside the
state, perhaps the West Virginia court will follow the law of the
principal case. As the court in Yates v. Joyce, supra, said, "The
common law abhors all manner of fraud, and wherever a person
is injured by the fraudulent acts or contrivance of another, it will
afford a remedy." While it is understandable that a general
creditor who has no lien nor judgment may be denied an action for
damages, the interest of a party who has spent time and money to
obtain a judgment should be protected from those who fradulently
conspire to deny him the fruits of his effort. If the debtor's acts
are designed to prevent satisfaction of this judgment, the debtor
and his conspirators should be required to compensate the judgment
creditor for expenses or losses occasioned by their acts.
John Welton Fisher,II

Mortgages-The Doctrine of Future Advances
X, a corporation, borrowed money for the purpose of building
homes upon certain real estate and executed a construction loan
deed of trust upon the real estate to secure the loan. The deed
of trust provided for a schedule of payments and that the lender
could advance any part of, or the whole of, any payment before it
became due, and the same would be deemed to be made in pursuance of the agreement. In a proceeding involving disbursement of
proceeds of foreclosure sales, the circuit court ratified the auditor's
reports disbursing proceeds to the holder of X's notes secured by
the first deed of trust, and the trustee in bankruptcy and suppliers
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